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Introduction 
 
In the wake of the Asian financial crisis Indonesia was faced by a political transition, when 
president Suharto was forced to resign in May 1998 after an authoritarian rule of more than 
thirty years. This event was of tremendous historical significance as it marked the beginning 
of a democratization process, leading to general elections in 2001 and the first presidential 
elections in Indonesian history three years later. The investigation will focus on the foreign 
policy of Indonesia in the post-Suharto period. More specifically an answer will be given to 
the following research question: to what extent do democratic values shape Indonesian 
foreign policy? The definition used for democratic values in this thesis originates in liberal 
thought. That is, they are defined as those values supporting the fundamental principle of 
individual freedom and liberal rights of freedom from arbitrary authority, equality before the 
law, and democratic representation or participation (Doyle, 1983, pp. 206-207). 
The choice for this research question is based on the fact that existing literature on 
post-Suharto Indonesian foreign policy fails to address such a topic. Instead, most of the 
works focus on the influence of Islam on foreign policy, which is generally said to have 
grown since the fall of the Suharto regime (Sukma, 2003; Azra, 2006; Perwita, 2007; Anwar, 
2010). Sukma (2011; 2012) is the only author who does address the topic, arguing that 
democracy has become an important context for the making and conduct of foreign policy 
following the political transition, but is faced by both domestic and regional constraints. A 
systematic investigation into the influence of democratic values, then, would fill a gap in the 
literature. 
The research is similarly relevant from a theoretical perspective. This is not to say, that 
the influence of democratization on foreign policy is not discussed in existing theories, 
because liberalism does address the topic. Liberals believe that the spread of liberal 
democracy will decrease the number of international conflicts (Burchill, 2013, p. 59). The 
rationale behind this is that all liberal democratic countries are said to adhere to the 
aforementioned principle of individual freedom and the three rights that accompany it (Doyle, 
1983, pp. 206-207). Liberalism, however, is not able to tell how these principles exactly shape 
foreign policy. Social constructivism, in contrast, has a far greater sensitivity for norms and 
values in claiming that ideational structures are as important as material structures (Reus-
Smit, 2013, p. 224), but does not address democratization processes. This is the theoretical 
gap the thesis looks to fill.  
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According to constructivists identity is important because it strongly implies a 
particular set of interests or preferences in respect of choice of action. A state will try to do 
the right thing in accordance with its identity (Flockhart, 2012, pp. 85-86). This is also the 
case in the making of foreign policy as exemplified by Ashizawa’s (2008, pp. 578-580) value-
action framework. This framework is comprised of three components: values, preferences, 
and foreign policy actions. Values determine the preference for a particular policy direction, 
which, to be achieved, in turn require certain actions. In practice, a number of different values   
often exist, sometimes leading to incompatible preferences. When this occurs one value 
becomes dominant over another depending on the nature of the issue and the actors involved.  
State identity, defined as “one kind of identity that refers to the image of individuality 
and distinctiveness held and projected by the state within particular international contexts”, 
has an important role in the value-action framework being the source from which values arise. 
That said, two propositions have to be mentioned. First, identities exist in the plural; a country 
can, for example, have a Christian and a democratic identity at the same time. Second, 
identities are not the sole source of foreign policy-dominant values; they can equally arise 
from a long-term policy prescription (Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 575 and 581-582). 
Keeping this in mind the research will be best served by carrying out a type of 
congruence procedure, namely a multiple within-case comparison. This entails making a 
number of paired observations of values on the independent (IV) and dependent variable (DV) 
across a range of circumstances within a case. Subsequently a comparison is made between 
the measured and the predicted values to test the hypothesis (Van Evera, 1997, pp. 61-62). In 
this case a democratic identity is the independent variable, whereas foreign policy is the 
dependent variable.  
The case that is used to answer the research question is Indonesia’s policy towards 
Myanmar during the presidencies of Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(SBY) up to the general elections in Myanmar on 7 November 2010. This case is chosen for a 
number of reasons. First, the close relationship between the countries, both being members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia’s policy towards the country 
is thus a relevant part of its foreign relations. Second, the undemocratic political system of 
Myanmar. The country was governed by a military junta from 1962 until 2010 (Roberts, 
2010, pp. 55-56). During this period the European Union and United States of America have 
imposed multiple sanctions on the country for the violation of human rights (Kyaw, 2008, p. 
152).  
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Finally, regarding the chosen timeframe, the Abdurrahman Wahid presidency is 
excluded, because Indonesia was still in a chaotic period of democratic transition (Anwar, 
2000, pp. 81-83; Diamond, 2010, p. 34; Sukma, 2011, p. 111). Keeping the value-action 
framework (Ashizawa, 2008) in mind democratic values are expected to be shaping 
Indonesian foreign policy if the state has a democratic identity, which it lacked at this stage. 
Moreover, the presidency was relatively short lasting for less than two years from 20 October 
1999 to 23 July 2001. For this reason the number of available sources is small. 
The investigation is split into three sections, each showing a similar value on the IV.  
The foreign policy should therefore only change depending on the context and the individuals 
involved. On some occasions values derived from either the national ideology Pancasila or 
the free and active principle, both said to be influencing foreign policy (Anwar, 2003, pp. 1-3)  
may dominate, democratic values. Pancasila, which was adopted in 1945, is based on five 
principles: the belief in one god, Indonesian unity, internationalism or humanism, consultation 
and consensus, and social justice (Sukma, 2003, p. 19). The free and active principle, 
implying independence of action in international affairs, has three major components: anti-
colonialism, independence, and pragmatism (Anwar, 2010, pp. 38-39). That is, pragmatism in 
the sense that Indonesia does not side with one country or group of countries in particular, but 
establishes diplomatic relations with any country deemed necessary (Yaakub, 2009, p. 35).   
The first section will address the policy under president Megawati and minister of 
foreign affairs Hassan Wirajuda. This is followed by a research of foreign policy during 
SBY’s first presidential term in the second section, Wirajuda continued to be foreign minister 
on this occasion. The third and final section focusses on SBY’s second presidential term up to 
the Burmese general elections. Although this period is significantly shorter than the first two 
under review, it will be interesting to see whether a different minister of foreign affairs (Marty 
Natalegawa) causes a significant policy change. 
For the purpose of the investigation a discourse analysis is undertaken using a variety 
of different documents including speeches and statements of  presidents and ministers of 
foreign affairs, since they are dominant in determining the policy (Anwar, 2003; Sukma, 
2003; Azra, 2006), ASEAN documents, and bilateral treaties between Indonesia and 
Myanmar. The websites of ASEAN, the United Nations, and The Jakarta Post are the most 
important sources.  
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1. The Megawati presidency 
 
On 23 July 2001 Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Indonesia’s founder and first 
president Sukarno, became the country’s fifth president succeeding Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Megawati, who had served as vice-president during the Wahid presidency, was appointed so 
by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) after Wahid’s forced resignation. As her own 
political party, the PDI-P, only held a minority of the seats in the Indonesian parliament, she 
chose to form a broad coalition government of secular nationalist and Islamic parties, which 
had supported her presidency (Sukma, 2003, pp. 123-125). 
The resulting coalition proved to be a fragile one, since the PDI-P wanted to preserve 
the non-religious character of the state, while the two Islamic parties, the PPP and PBB 
demanded a greater role for Islam in society. Outside parliament the government was faced by 
a number of political and economic challenges, including the implementation of political 
reforms, battling corruption, and recovering the economy (Sukma, 2003, pp. 125-127).  
The domestic context was reflected in the objectives of foreign policy as formulated 
by the Department of Foreign Affairs: help boost economy and public welfare; help 
strengthen national unity, stability and integrity, and preserve nation’s sovereignty; develop 
bilateral relations especially with countries that can support Indonesia’s trade and investment 
and economic recovery; promote international cooperation that helps build and maintain 
world peace (Anwar, 2003, p. 4). 
In practice, Indonesia strengthened the relations with the economic powers the United 
States, China and Russia as well as with the ASEAN countries (Anwar, 2003, pp.6-8). The 
increased attention for its immediate neighbours marked the return of the concentric circle 
formula in Indonesian foreign policy (Sukma, 2003, p. 139). According to this formula the 
most attention is paid to countries in the first concentric circle around Indonesia (the ASEAN-
countries), followed by those in the second circle (Australia, China, East Timor, Japan, the 
Pacific Islands and South Korea) (Anwar, 2003, p. 3). 
Anwar (2003, pp. 5-6) is quite positive about the foreign policy during the Megawati 
presidency. She applauds her for her low-key style, concentration on economic recovery, and 
delegation of responsibility to foreign minister Hassan Wirajuda, a career diplomat. Although 
she does admit that Megawati proved unable to improve Indonesia’s international image or 
restore the confidence of investors; news of bloody conflicts, pervasive corruption and legal 
uncertainty continued to deter investors from returning to Indonesia (Anwar, 2005, pp. 110-
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111). Azra (2006, p. 145), in contrast, is less positive in arguing that Megawati chose to be 
passive rather than active in both her foreign and domestic policies. 
Without judging the policy between July 2001 and November 2004 on its success, 
Sukma (2011, p. 111) notes that it marked the beginning of democracy promotion in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy. A clear example of this is its lobby in ASEAN to adopt democracy 
and human rights as regional values in 2003. At the same time, the principle of non-
interference continued to play a role during the Megawati presidency as well, although 
observers differ on the resilience of the principle. According to Anwar (2005, p. 128) 
Indonesia did not turn a blind eye on the violation of human rights within ASEAN countries 
anymore, whereas Haacke (2003, p. 227) deemed the government to be unwilling to change 
the status quo. The time of writing, however, may have affected Haacke’s conclusions. 
At this point, both the domestic context and the foreign policy context are 
investigated. The chapter will continue with a discourse analysis of the policy towards 
Myanmar. This analysis is split into three parts, each focussing on a specific context: bilateral 
relations, ASEAN, and the United Nations. The value-action framework suggests policy may 
take a different shape depending on the actors involved (Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 580-581). 
 
Bilateral relations  
As the relations between Indonesia and Myanmar primarily take place within ASEAN the 
number of documents concerning bilateral relations is fairly limited. During the Megawati 
presidency one bilateral treaty was signed between the countries, namely an “agreement 
between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the government of the Union of 
Myanmar for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with 
respect to taxes on income” on the first of April 2003. This agreement applied to residents of 
both countries and concerned the Indonesian income tax, income tax in Myanmar, as well as 
the tax on profits in the latter country (Republic of Indonesia and Union of Myanmar, 2003, 
pp. 2-4). 
While predominantly technical in nature, the agreement showed the willingness from 
both sites to cooperate on fiscal matters, especially since article 31 reads that it could only be 
terminated after a five-year period (Republic of Indonesia and Union of Myanmar, 2003, p. 
39). The one-day visit Megawati made to Myanmar in August 2001, as part of a trip to all 
ASEAN-countries (Anwar, 2003, p. 6), was similarly aimed at enhancing cooperation 
(Xinhuanet, 2001). As was Wirajuda’s visit to the country in April 2003. Although foreign 
ministry director for East Asia and Pacific Primo Alui Joelianto said that the discussion with 
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high-ranking officials would focus on “several pending issues” as well (The Jakarta Post, 
2003). 
On other occasions, however, Indonesia adopted a more critical stance towards 
Myanmar. In July 2003 Wirajuda said that Myanmar needed to move forward in its 
democratization process, but emphasized that isolating the country or imposing sanctions 
against it would not be effective. Instead he preferred a dialog, which was deemed the only 
way to solve any issues. This contrasted with statements made by both Malaysian prime 
minister Mahathir Mohamad and foreign minister Syed Hamid, who said that ASEAN 
members had to consider expelling Myanmar from the regional grouping (Siboro and 
Unidjaja, 2003). These statements were a response to the incarceration of Burmese opposition 
leader Aung Sang Suu Kyi and many of her party members in May of the same year (Kyaw, 
2008, p. 157). 
Concerns about Suu Kyi’s detention were repeated a few days later on the side-lines of 
a meeting between Asian and African officials, when Wirajuda said that Burmese leaders had 
guaranteed her release before an ASEAN Summit scheduled in October. These remarks came 
as a surprise to Myanmar’s minister of foreign affairs, Win Aung, who did not know why his 
Indonesian counterpart made these comments. Subsequently he could not make any promises 
concerning Suu Kyi’s release, apart from saying that they did not have any intention to 
“prolong that arrangement” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2003). 
By September 24 the opposition leader was still detained, to the frustration of 
Indonesia. Therefore, envoy to Myanmar and former foreign minister Ali Alatas met with 
leaders of the junta and handed over letters conveying Indonesian concerns about the 
situation. These concerns were not only of a bilateral nature, as Alatas stated the following:  
“we would like to believe that it is in the interest of ASEAN and (Burma) that no 
extraneous issue such as the problem of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would mar the 
deliberations of ASEAN” ( quoted in British Broadcasting Corporation, 2003).  
In some way one could say that Indonesia’s reputation was at stake here as well, being the 
chair of ASEAN that year (Haacke, 2006, p. 52). This topic will be explored further in the 
following section, which focusses on Indonesia’s policy towards Myanmar within the regional 
gathering. 
 
ASEAN 
A first step towards analysing Indonesian policy is made by comparing the joint 
communiques of the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (AMM), a meeting between 
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foreign ministers. In this way the importance of the political situation in Myanmar among 
policymakers can be traced. The first of such meetings during Megawati’s presidency was the 
35
th
 AMM on July 29 and 30, 2002 in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. Judging from its joint 
communiqué the political situation in Myanmar was not really an issue at that time; nothing is 
said about Burma specifically. This is not to say, that the foreign ministers, did not pay 
attention to the human rights situation in the region. They “recalled the decision made by the 
26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting to consider the establishment of an appropriate mechanism 
on human rights”, but emphasized the importance of non-interference as well (ASEAN, 
2002). 
Regarding human rights, the Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism (Working Group) was deemed an important dialogue partner (ASEAN, 2002). 
This working group, a coalition of various national working groups, organized four 
workshops for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism over the period 2001-2004 of which 
two were held in Indonesia, and one in both the Philippines and Thailand (Working Group for 
an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, n.d.). The first workshop was convened in Jakarta in 
early July 2001 during the Wahid presidency. The fact that it was co-hosted by the Working 
Group, the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, and the Indonesian Department 
of Foreign Affairs shows Indonesia’s willingness to promote human rights (Working Group 
for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, 2001). 
 During the 36
th
 AMM, which was held in Phnom Penh on June 16 and 17, 2003, the 
situation in Myanmar did make it to the agenda. The ministers of foreign affairs “noted the 
efforts of the Government of Myanmar to promote peace and development”, but “urged 
Myanmar to resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties 
concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy.” The United Nations was also to 
play a role in this transition through the efforts of Tan Sri Razali Ismail, the United Nations 
Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Myanmar. Burmese assurance that the measures taken 
against Suu Kyi and fellow party members were temporary, prevented the ministers from 
considering any sanctions. Apart from this a call was made for Myanmar’s participation in 
both the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The 
comments made about human rights were similar to those made in the joint communiqué a 
year earlier (ASEAN, 2003a). 
Nor does the discourse on human rights in the joint communiqué of the 37
th
 AMM,  
held in Jakarta the following year, signal a break with the past. The foreign ministers noted 
the reconvening of the National Convention in Myanmar and the role it could play in the 
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drafting of a new constitution, which should be followed by elections. In addition they 
emphasized the continued relevance of the comments made a year earlier, underlining “the 
need for the involvement of all strata of Myanmar society in the on-going National 
Convention” (ASEAN, 2004a). 
In her speech at the opening of the 37
th
 AMM  Megawati (2004) stated that 
“free, honest and successful elections were recently held in South Korea, Malaysia, Sri 
Lanka, India, the Philippines and here in Indonesia. In this context, we gladly note that 
a member of the ASEAN family, Myanmar, has added its voice to the cause of 
promoting democracy. We do encourage Myanmar to take every action that will add 
substance to the expression of its democratic aspirations.” 
 This was not only in their own interest, but even more so in the interest of ASEAN. 
Reforms were needed to enable the regional community to ride the positive waves of 
democratization and economic integration. The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, also 
known as the Bali Concord II,  was to be the blueprint for this integration. The Concord, 
adopted during the ninth ASEAN Summit, held in Bali, in October 2003 proposed the 
establishment of an ASEAN Community comprising three elements: a security- (ASC), 
economic- (AEC), and socio-cultural community (ASCC) (ASEAN, 2003b, pp. 4-8). 
According to Sukma (2008, pp. 137-138), the ASC was proposed by Indonesia, which 
headed the regional community in 2003. Originally, however, Indonesia was aiming for a 
broader definition of security than eventually came about; it wanted to include political 
development, alongside norms setting, preventing and resolving conflict, and peacebuilding.  
Opposition of other member states prevented this goal from making the Concord, which 
reaffirmed the principle of non-interference. This being said, the original “democracy agenda” 
does shine through in the following sentence: “the ASEAN Security Community is envisaged 
to bring ASEAN’s political and security cooperation to a higher plane to ensure that 
countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, 
democratic and harmonious environment” (ASEAN, 2003b, p. 4). 
 The next step towards creating an ASC was drafting a document which outlined the 
concrete measures to be taken towards this goal. The document Indonesia drafted in February 
2004 for this purpose, marked a return to the original democracy agenda. That is, the plan of 
action stipulated that regular and free general elections were to be undertaken in all ASEAN 
countries by 2017 and that an ASEAN Charter of Rights and Obligations of the People, 
accompanied by a regional commission on human rights, was to be developed by 2006. 
Similar to the plans a year earlier, Indonesia’s draft faced strong opposition of other member 
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countries, including Myanmar. Therefore, the document that was eventually adopted had a 
different tone, as will be shown in the following chapter (Roberts, 2010, pp. 181-183).  
The difference between Indonesia’s original plans for an ASC and the final outcome 
showed that the country’s policymakers were not willing to put the relationship with other 
ASEAN countries at risk to promote democratic values. In the end, consensus, one of the 
principles of Pancasila, was the preferred option. This preference for consensus can also be 
seen in actions directly concerning Myanmar.  
During the 36
th
 AMM, Wirajuda initiated the plan to send a ministerial delegation to 
the country, which was supported by all the foreign ministers (Unidjaja, 2003a). Indonesia 
took the lead in this affair, but did not want to act unilaterally. On June 29 Marty Natalegawa, 
then Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, said that Indonesia was waiting for a Burmese 
proposal regarding the delegation (Unidjaja, 2003b). This was followed by a statement a few 
days later that Indonesia accepted the responsibilities of being chair, but could not act on its 
own (Associated Press, 2003). 
 
United Nations 
The previous section analysed Indonesian policy within its own region, this section will focus 
on policy on global level, namely within the United Nations. The United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) adopted three resolutions on the situation of human rights in Myanmar 
during the period under review: one on 24 December 2001 during the 56
th 
session of the 
UNGA, one on 18 December 2002 during its 57
th 
session, and the final one on 23 December 
2003 during its 58
th
 session. These were all adopted without a recorded vote. On a whole, the 
three resolutions welcomed the efforts made by the government of Myanmar, and its 
willingness to cooperate with both the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Myanmar 
and the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. At the same time, it urged 
the government to stop violating human rights and to respect the outcome of the 1990 
elections by cooperating with the opposition (UNGA, 2001; 2002; 2003). 
Since the resolutions were all adopted without a recorded vote, it is hard to discern 
Indonesia’s stance towards them. In this regard, statements by Wirajuda (2001; 2002; 2004) 
and Megawati (2003) made at the UNGA sessions are helpful to reveal its international 
agenda. In his speech ‘the democratic response’ held on November 15 2001 Wirajuda 
expressed his confidence in democracy as an instrument to combat global challenges, 
including international terrorism. Democratization was to be achieved both on the domestic- 
and the international level as the former was a precondition for the latter. 
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These words were repeated in his statement at the UNGA in the following year, while 
adding that democratization among nations requires multilateralism. This entails respect for 
one and other, mutual consultations and consensus. Responding to the critique that consensus-
building within ASEAN obstructed assertiveness, he argued that “multilateralism gives 
ASEAN coherence, commitment and perseverance in the pursuit of its goals” (Wirajuda, 
2002). Megawati’s (2003) speech at the 58th session was primarily preoccupied with the battle 
against international terrorism, but stressed Indonesia’s willingness to build “a better region 
and more democratic world.” In a similar vein Wirajuda (2004) said Indonesia was “devoutly 
committed” to making democracy work.  
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2. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Hassan Wirajuda 
 
On 20 October 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was inaugurated as the sixth president of 
the Republic of Indonesia. More importantly, he was the first president in Indonesian history 
to be elected directly, defeating Megawati in the second round of the presidential elections. 
Like his predecessor, SBY was necessitated to form a broad coalition cabinet of both 
nationalist and Islamic parties. This was the case because his own Partai Demokrat (PD) only 
had won a minority of the seats in parliament during the legislative elections of April that 
year. According to Ricklefs (2008, pp. 402-404) the cabinet fell short on both cohesion and 
effectiveness. 
 Similarities in the domestic context were reflected in the international relations of 
Indonesia as Yaakub (2009, p. 44) argues that the policy during SBY’s first presidential term 
mirrored that of Megawati. In both cases ASEAN countries knew a prominent position in 
foreign policy, followed by those countries of economic importance outside Southeast Asia. 
In addition, Hassan Wirajuda continued to be the minister of foreign affairs. At the same time, 
however, SBY departed from his predecessor in stressing the importance of engaging with the 
wider development world, in particular with Islamic countries. 
 Increasing engagement with the Muslim world was in line with a speech the president 
gave before the Indonesian Council on World Affairs on May 19, 2005. In this speech he 
stated that Indonesia’s independent and active approach to foreign policy should reflect the 
country’s international identity, which in turn “must be rooted in a strong sense of who we 
are.” That is, “a country where democracy, Islam and modernity go hand-in-hand” 
(Yudhoyono, 2005). Nonetheless, Anwar (2010, p.48) and Sukma (2012, p. 86) argue that 
foreign policy, while mindful of domestic Muslim pressure, was not Islamic in nature.  
The promotion of democratic values is said to have gained an even more prominent 
position in policymaking during SBY’s presidency. Acccording to Sukma (2011, p. 113), 
Indonesia kept supporting the principle of non-interference within ASEAN, but refused to 
hide behind these principle when human rights were at stake; human rights were no longer 
considered an internal matter. Beyond ASEAN, the organization of the first Bali Democracy 
Forum (BDF) on 10 and 11 December 2008 gave a clear indication of Indonesia’s democracy 
agenda. The BDF was an intergovernmental forum open to all countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region, both democratic and non-democratic; countries from other parts of the world could 
apply for observer status. During this forum officials from various participating countries 
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shared their experiences on the transition to democracy, while they also discussed the 
possibilities of cooperation on the fields of human rights and the rule of law (Halans and 
Nassy, 2013, pp. 2-3). 
With both the domestic context and the foreign policy context outlined, the chapter 
will continue with a discourse analysis of the policy towards Myanmar. This analysis is split 
into three parts, each focussing on a specific context: bilateral relations, ASEAN, and the 
United Nations. Keeping the value-action framework in mind, one may expect policy to take a 
different shape depending on the actors involved (Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 580-581). 
 
Bilateral relations 
During the first presidential of SBY two bilateral agreements were signed between the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Union of Myanmar, both in 2006. The first of these agreements 
was signed on March 1 in Yangon and concerned a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on 
“the establishment of a joint commission for bilateral cooperation.” This commission was to 
be established to promote the collaboration between both countries on topics ranging from 
culture to economics, to strengthen their friendship. The opening sentences of the MoU state 
that three principles should be leading in the work of the commission: “equality, mutual 
benefit and full respect for sovereignty.” As was the case with the agreement signed three 
years earlier, mutual trust was expressed in the fact that the arrangement could only be 
terminated after five years (Republic of Indonesia and Union of Myanmar, 2006a, pp. 1-3). 
 According to an article in The Jakarta Post there was a clear rationale behind 
Indonesia’s constructive approach towards Myanmar; the MoU could help persuading the 
junta to take further measures towards democratization. Wirajuda stated that Indonesia was 
willing to help smoothen the process to democracy, although he did not want to specify on the 
role the country could play in the release of Suu Kyi (Hotland, 2006a). Similarly, SBY did not 
mention Suu Kyi during his press conference in Yangon on 3 March concluding a state visit 
to Myanmar. Nor had the situation been discussed with general Than Shwe. That is, not 
explicitly, as he told the leader of the junta that reconciliation efforts should include all 
parties. SBY was positive about the efforts made towards a new constitution, while requesting 
the junta to brief ASEAN on new developments. This request was made following a refusal to 
give representatives of both ASEAN and the UN access to the country (Hotland, 2006b). 
 The second agreement was signed on the fourteenth of November in Jakarta and 
concerned a MoU on the “cooperation in the exchange of financial intelligence related to 
money laundering and financing of terrorism.” In contrast to the ones discussed earlier, this 
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agreement could be terminated at any point in time. The designated authorities of the 
Indonesian Financial Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre and of the Central Control 
Board of Myanmar agreed to share information with each other either spontaneously or upon 
request, but were free to deny a request if sharing would be against their own interests 
(Republic of Indonesia and Union of Myanmar, 2006b, pp. 1-3). 
 Thus far foreign policy on a bilateral level showed similarities to that during the 
preceding period in the sense that democratic values were part of Indonesian rhetoric but not 
of official documents; cooperation was pursued regardless of the political and humanitarian 
situation in the former British colony. A marked difference was the attention given to the 
detention of Suu Kyi, which returned to the agenda in January 2008. As Wirajuda expressed 
his frustration over the lack of progress made: 
“we wish to see a more credible process in the implementation of their roadmap to 
democracy” (quoted in Pathoni, 2008). 
 In addition, he urged the junta to release political prisoners, including the leader of the 
opposition. Nevertheless, the foreign minister, making this statement during an annual foreign 
affairs briefing, did not consider taking sanctions against the country. Unlike other countries 
in the region, Indonesia did not ignore the problems in Burma, but chose to be “pro-active” 
hoping to bring about change by upholding close relations with the junta (Pathoni, 2008). The 
regional powers India and China may well be some of the other countries Wirajuda was 
referring to, since foreign ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said the following about these 
countries in June 2009:  
"those countries play a key role to find a settlement in Myanmar's issue (…) and we 
very much would like to see them urge Myanmar to embrace the value of human rights. 
(…) To exert more pressure on Myanmar, we want to bring the UN forum into a 
ministerial level forum but the idea has not been welcomed by India, citing concerns of 
its national interests” (quoted in Budianto, 2009b). 
 Indonesia, then, was criticizing India and China for brushing over the mounting 
problems in Myanmar, but can be accused of doing the same when it supported the Burmese 
nuclear energy program. Indonesian official Rezlan Ishar Jenie argued that Myanmar, as a 
signee to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, had the right to develop nuclear energy. While 
adding that the support was to be separated from concerns over human rights abuse. This was 
a controversial standpoint given the possibility to use nuclear capabilities for military 
purposes (Budianto, 2009c). A serious risk as the junta had used another type of weapons of 
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mass destruction, namely chemical weapons, on five occasions between 1984 and 2005 
(Roberts, 2010, p. 59). 
 The nuclear energy program showed that tensions may arise when policymakers 
simultaneously try to pursue a democracy agenda and maintain close relations with a military 
regime. Similar tensions arose during the state visit of Burmese prime minister Thein Sein to 
Indonesia. The discussion between SBY and the prime minister concerned democratization 
and the Rohingya refugees, but the leaders also agreed on intensifying military and economic 
cooperation; bilateral trade, worth $300,000,000 in 2009, was to increase. Bilateral 
cooperation was also pursued to solve the problem of Rohingya refugees entering Indonesia. 
In addition, the UN Refugee Agency and the International Organization for Migration were to 
play a role. Indonesia promised to extend the humanitarian assistance to 400 Rohingya 
stranded in Aceh, until a final solution was found (Maulia, 2009). The Rohingya are an 
Islamic ethnic group, which faces persecution in Myanmar (Budianto, 2009a).  
 
ASEAN 
With the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Myanmar during the first presidential term 
of SBY discussed, this section will focus on Indonesian policy within ASEAN. As was 
indicated in the previous chapter, Indonesian policymakers were forced to abandon the 
democracy agenda they had in mind when they made a proposal for the establishment of an 
ASEAN Security Community, due to criticism of fellow member countries.  
It was only a month after SBY had assumed office, that the Vientiane Action 
Programme (VAP) was adopted during the tenth ASEAN Summit held in Vientiane on 
November 29 and 30, 2004. This document stipulated the measures to be taken towards 
realizing the ASC, as well as the AEC and the ASCC. In contrast to the Indonesian draft of 
February, the chapter dealing with the ASC did not mention elections, nor the establishment 
of a human rights committee. This is not to say that the issue of human rights was left out 
completely; the VAP considered the promotion of human rights and obligations as being one 
of the strategies of political development (ASEAN, 2004b). 
The stance foreign ministers adopted towards Myanmar during the 38
th
 AMM held in 
Vientiane on 26 July 2005 was even less critical in tone than the VAP. The joint communiqué 
applauded the junta for its decision to relinquish its turn as chair of ASEAN in 2006 and 
instead focus on national reconciliation and the democratization process (ASEAN, 2005). The 
adoption of a constructive approach towards the Burmese regime is a trend reoccurring in the 
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joint communiqués of the AMMs, although they did become more critical as the years went 
by.  
During the 39
th
 AMM held in Kuala Lumpur on July 25, 2006, the ministers 
“expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation process and hope[d] to see 
tangible progress that would lead to peaceful transition to democracy in the near future.” In 
addition, they called for the “early release” of members of the opposition held under detention 
(ASEAN, 2006). Concrete calls for the junta to convey democratic elections in a specific year 
entered the discourse in 2008, as the joint communiqué of the 41
st
 AMM in Singapore read 
the following: ”we urged Myanmar to take bolder steps towards a peaceful transition to 
democracy in the near future, and working towards the holding of free and fair General 
Elections in 2010” (ASEAN, 2008).  
As an article in the Jakarta Globe suggested the following year: leaders within 
ASEAN became increasingly frustrated with Burmese inaction. Wirajuda even went as far as 
acknowledging that the diplomatic efforts permitted under the principle of non-interference 
had proved  insufficient in changing the situation in Myanmar: 
“our dialogues with Burma have reached an impasse, (…) even efforts by other 
countries, such as exerting diplomatic pressure and imposing sanctions, have not been 
strong enough to push them to change” (quoted in Osman, 2009). 
What is missing in all statements is any mention of human rights violations in the 
junta-led country. This is not to say that human rights seized to play a role within ASEAN; 
the possible establishment of a human rights commission, as originally proposed by 
Indonesia,  returned to the agenda during the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. This document 
was intended to provide the association with a legal and institutional framework (ASEAN, 
2007, p. 3). In the months prior to its adoption in November 2007, officials from Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Singapore tried to include the provision for a human rights body. A plan 
that was, quite unsurprisingly, rejected by Myanmar (Khalik, 2007). 
Ultimately, the objections of Myanmar and other members (Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam) were overcome since the provision made it to the charter (Roberts, 2010, p. 185); 
article 14.1 stipulated that “in conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN 
charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body” (ASEAN, 2007, p. 19). Note, that 
these principles included non-interference and consensus (Roberts, 2010, 186), but also 
“democracy and constitutional government” (ASEAN, 2007, p. 6). 
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 What the terms of reference of this human rights body would be was to be decided by 
the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries during an AMM (ASEAN, 2007). This meant 
that a number of hurdles were still to be taken before such a body could come about; the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was inaugurated in 
October 2009. Notwithstanding efforts from the Indonesian side to give the AICHR the 
authority to conduct monitoring missions in member states (Alexandra, 2012, p. 53), its 
primary role became that of an advisory council. In addition, it was in charge of drafting an 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (ASEAN, 2009, pp. 6-7). As an anonymous source told 
The Jakarta Post in July 2009: Indonesia was essentially the only country in favour of giving 
the AICHR a broader mandate (Suryodiningrat, 2009). 
 
United Nations 
Where Indonesia proved to be one of Myanmar’s loudest critics and a champion of human 
rights within ASEAN, it chose to side with its Southeast Asian neighbour on the global level. 
On one occasion, Indonesia voted against the adoption of a resolution on the situation of 
human rights in Myanmar in the General Assembly (UNGA, 2006), whereas it abstained its 
vote on two occasions (UNGA, 2007; UNGA, 2008). When comparing Indonesia’s voting 
behaviour with those of other countries, one finds it to be part of a minority of countries not 
supporting the resolutions. At the same time, voting behaviour was in line with that of other 
ASEAN countries. In all instances the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand abstained their 
vote, while other members decided to oppose the resolutions. Indonesia, then, was the only 
one to change is vote.  
 Being a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 
2007 and 2008, Indonesia also had the right to vote on a resolution in January 2007, which 
“called on Myanmar’s Government to cease military attacks against civilians in ethnic 
minority regions and begin a substantive political dialogue that would lead to a genuine 
democratic transition.” As was the case in the General Assembly, however, Indonesia refused 
to support a resolution targeted against the Burmese junta. Permanent representative to the 
UN, Rezlan Ishar Jenie, defended this position by arguing that the situation in Myanmar, 
while problematic, did not form “a clear and present danger to the rest of the world.” 
Therefore, “other United Nations bodies, such as the Human Rights Council, were more 
appropriate venues for addressing the problem of Myanmar” (UNSC, 2007a).  
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3. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Marty Natalegawa 
 
With the foreign policy during the presidency of Megawati and the first presidential term of 
SBY investigated, this chapter will focus on Indonesian policy in the one-year period from 22 
October 2009 until the general elections in Myanmar on 7 November 2010. After his victory 
in the 2004 presidential elections SBY managed to remain in office for a second term 
beginning in 2009. This time around, receiving enough votes in the first round of the 
presidential elections. Even though the president was in a better position to mould a new 
cabinet, than five years earlier (the legislative elections had made the PD into the largest party 
in parliament), he decided to rely on yet another broad coalition government (Sukma, 2010, 
pp. 61 and 67-69). 
 Perhaps the biggest change from the preceding cabinet, in the case of foreign policy 
that is, was the appointment of the diplomat Marty Natalegawa as the new minister of foreign 
affairs. Natalegawa had in the past served as the Indonesian ambassador to Great Britain, and 
most recently as the country’s permanent representative to the United Nations. With a new 
foreign  minister, a new doctrine entered foreign policy, namely that of dynamic equilibrium. 
The doctrine indicates that, since the end of the Cold War, the possibilities for countries to 
become a new power in international relations through peaceful cooperation have increased 
(Umar, 2011).  
Whether dynamic equilibrium has had an impact on the  policy towards Myanmar will 
be examined by carrying out a discourse analysis in the remainder of this chapter. This 
analysis is split into three parts, each focussing on a specific context: bilateral relations, 
ASEAN, and the United Nations. Keeping the value-action framework in mind, one may 
expect policy to take a different shape depending on the actors involved (Ashizawa, 2008, pp. 
580-581). 
 
Bilateral relations 
To celebrate the 60
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Myanmar, the 
Indonesian ambassador to Myanmar wrote a special feature in The Myanmar Times. In this 
feature, Sebastianus Sumarsono (2009) highlighted the socio-cultural aspect of the 
relationship, “considering that it will give a positive contribution for closer political, 
economic, consular, and security and defense relations.” In addition, he gave a short overview 
of the sixty years of “bilateral friendship”, arguing that “Indonesia also strongly supports 
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Myanmar’s democratization process” and “consistently carried-out “constructive 
engagement” to assist Myanmar in resolving its political crisis.”  
 Although he briefly touched on the political situation in the junta-led country, 
Sumarsono did not expand on the topic. This is imaginable given the nature of the 
contribution and its publication in a (censored) Burmese newspaper. In another policy 
statement the upcoming elections took centre stage. On the sixth of February the Indonesian 
ambassador was confident that the general elections would be truly inclusive since the 
government had promised this, while adding that Indonesia was willing to support the country 
in the process of democratization if needed (The Jakarta Post, 2010). 
 This confidence proved unfounded a month later; the military junta had issued a law 
which prohibited every person convicted by a criminal court from joining a political party. In 
this way, it prevented Suu Kyi from running in the elections. According to foreign ministry 
spokesman Teuku Faizasyah,  
“the new regulations were regrettable (…) because it will result in an election that fails 
inclusivity” (quoted in Budianto, 2010a).  
A decision to deny foreign observers and journalists access to the country during the elections 
was similarly critiqued by Indonesia. Natalegawa exposed his frustration about the situation 
when he said that the junta had not lived up to the expectations. Even exclusive elections, 
however, were considered a step forward (Adamrah, 2010). 
 
ASEAN 
Indonesian policy on the bilateral level essentially centred around the double exclusivity of 
the upcoming elections, both in terms of those allowed to compete in them and those allowed 
to report about them. The joint communiqué of the 43
rd
 AMM held in Hanoi in July indicates 
that Indonesian worries were shared by other foreign ministers. They “underscored the 
importance of national reconciliation in Myanmar and the holding of the general election in a 
free, fair, and inclusive manner, thus contributing to Myanmar's stability and development” 
and “also stressed the need for Myanmar to continue to work with ASEAN and the United 
Nations in this process” (ASEAN, 2010). 
 It is unsure which countries were pushing for the inclusion of this statement in the 
joint communiqué, but it is certainly in line with Indonesia’s opinion on the situation in 
Myanmar. The fact that SBY and Natalegawa raised these particular issues at the ASEAN 
summits in April and October is a testament to this (Adamrah, 2010; Budianto, 2010b). While 
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Indonesia may have taken the lead in pushing Myanmar to make a better effort, Natalegawa 
indicated that it could count on broad support in the regional grouping: 
“as you may know, it’s not just Indonesia but the whole of ASEAN thinks Myanmar has 
not provided a positive response [to our calls]” (quoted in Adamrah, 2010).  
 
United Nations 
Besides ASEAN, Natalegawa said that he expected the broader international community and 
the UN in particular “to play a continued positive role on the issue” during a press conference 
at the headquarters of the United Nations. To be able to play this role he deemed it important 
“to have both very honest, candid, frank and even robust expectations from Myanmar, but at 
the same time to engage with that country.” This meant that countries were permitted to take 
sanctions against the junta, but these would not lead to a viable solution, unless combined 
with some form of constructive engagement. While highlighting the role the international 
community could play, the foreign minister emphasized that he wished 
“very much to see Myanmar not miss this opportunity to resolve the situation in that 
country in a good way with the international community’s support (…) but this is a 
process, as professor Gambari is fond of saying, it’s not an event and that process is 
happening just now” (Natalegawa, 2009). 
 As was the case before, Indonesia was certainly in favour of international involvement 
in Myanmar, but this involvement was to be constructive. The country continued to reject any 
resolutions issued by the UNGA and the UNSC, judging from the fact that it was one of the 
39 countries abstaining its vote on a UNGA draft resolution. Cambodia, Singapore, and 
Thailand showed the same voting behaviour, whereas most other members of ASEAN voted 
against the resolution; the Philippines was absent (UNGA, 2009). 
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Conclusion 
 
With the foreign policy of Indonesia towards Myanmar between July 2001 and November 
2010 investigated, an answer will be given to the research question: to what extent do 
democratic values shape Indonesian foreign policy? It is argued that Indonesia’s democratic 
identity (IV) has manifested itself in its policy towards Myanmar (DV). This proves that 
social constructivist theory in general, and Ashizawa’s value-action framework in particular, 
are applicable to values associated with democratization; a topic that remained relatively 
under investigated in the theoretical literature until this point. Similarly in line with the value-
action framework the dominance of these values appears to be context-dependent, since other 
values are at play as well. That is, there are clear differences between Indonesian policy on 
the bilateral level, in ASEAN, and in the United Nations.  
Minor differences notwithstanding,  the discourse remained the same across the three 
presidencies. While a thorough analysis of this observation is not to take place here, two 
broad reasons can be identified. First, the fact that Indonesia and Myanmar are intrinsically 
linked to one and other through ASEAN means that the country is constrained in pursuing an 
independent policy towards the country. Not only because it has to take the opinion of other 
members into account, but also because damaging the relations with Myanmar may have 
negative consequences for the functioning of the regional grouping. Second, there was 
continuity in the people in charge of foreign policymaking; Hassan Wirajuda was the minister 
of foreign affairs during the first two periods, whereas SBY’s presidency spanned the latter 
two. 
Bilateral relations showed a careful balance between a democracy agenda and 
cooperation. The latter was inspired by the principle of consultation and consensus of 
Pancasila, but served national interests as well. Democratic values came to the fore front in 
Indonesia’s preoccupation with the political situation in Myanmar. During the Megawati 
presidency this focussed on the release of political prisoners, Suu Kyi in particular. In the 
following periods this shifted to a concrete democracy agenda; by this time calls were made 
for national reconciliation and democratization. 
While the content of policy changed, the preference of cooperation over confrontation 
remained a constant factor. At various points in time, Indonesian officials critiqued the junta 
over the lack of progress made, but never considered taking sanctions. Not even at the 
moment that Mahathir Mohamad said that ASEAN had to consider expelling the country. Nor 
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did the political situation in Myanmar prevent Indonesia from signing a number of bilateral 
agreements in fields ranging from security to trade.  
The values shaping bilateral relations were also present in the policies pursued within 
ASEAN. The establishment of the AICHR in October 2009 was to a large extent  Indonesia’s 
achievement. Indonesian policymakers had first proposed such a commission in 2004 and 
again so in 2007, when the plan was approved by all members of the regional grouping and 
made it to the ASEAN Charter. Still, the mandate the AICHR received was not nearly as 
broad as originally intended.  
Alongside the establishment of a human rights commission, Indonesians strived for the 
democratization of all member countries. This process began during the presidency of 
Megawati, when the plans for an ASEAN Security community were presented, which adopted 
a broad definition of security including political development. The draft for the Vientiane 
Action Plan even made a concrete call for general elections to be convened in all ASEAN 
countries by 2017. In 2010, SBY and Natalegawa were the ones pushing, at the ASEAN 
summits, for inclusive elections in Myanmar. 
The fact that the adoption of documents within ASEAN requires consensus, prevented 
Indonesia from implementing many of its plans, at least in their original form. Pancasila, 
then, was a necessary part of  foreign policy. Disregarding consensus-seeking as being merely 
a practical necessity, however, would not do justice to the evidence; in many of their 
statements concerning Myanmar, policymakers emphasized that they were not just speaking 
for their own, but that their views were shared by other members. In addition, even when 
Indonesia had the authority to take the lead in sending a mission to the junta-led country it 
still preferred to act multilaterally, rather than unilaterally.  
 There was a marked contrast between Indonesia’s foreign policy towards Myanmar at 
the United Nations  and that on the bilateral and regional level. Whereas Indonesia took a 
leading role in promoting human rights within ASEAN, it refused to do so at the global 
gathering. This is not to say that policymakers were all of a sudden indifferent to the political 
and humanitarian problems in Myanmar, but democratic rhetoric was not supported by pro-
democracy actions.  
Not on a single occasion did Indonesia vote in favour of a resolution on the human 
rights situation in Myanmar. Instead it defended non-interference, a leading principle of 
ASEAN and one of the components of the free and active principle. Given the content of the 
resolutions, votes in favour of them could have had negative consequences for Indonesia’s 
ability to influence the junta through constructive engagement. Especially since none of the 
23 
 
other members of ASEAN casted a positive vote. Note, that policymakers were not against 
UN intervention per se; they supported the activities of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council. 
 Despite Indonesia’s muted support for democracy in Myanmar at the UN, in general it 
is clear that democratic values did partly shape Indonesian foreign policy, both during the 
presidency of Megawati and the two presidential terms of SBY. The influence of these values 
depended on the context with consensus and non-interference also shaping policy. Perhaps 
surprisingly given the attention it gets in the literature, Islam was not a factor shaping the 
relations between Indonesia and Myanmar, even though Muslims face persecution in the latter 
country.  
 Although Indonesia was straightforward about its democratic intentions, it was not 
willing to put its relationship with Myanmar on the line. Therefore, constructive engagement 
was the preferred strategy. By constructively engaging with the local authorities and seeking 
support from other ASEAN countries, as well as the international community at large, 
policymakers hoped to convince the junta from the benefits of democratization. In line with 
Natalegawa’s doctrine of dynamic equilibrium, then, Indonesia fulfilled the role of a 
cooperative leader, but it already did so prior to the formulation of this doctrine. 
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